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ESSAY
XXVI
SIN AND REPENTANCE
by Rev. E. J. Mahoney, D.D.
I.
INTRODUCTION
1. The
purpose of human existence
It is characteristic
of our modern civilization and a result of the ceaseless activity and
speed of our lives that men think very little, if at all, about the
purpose of their existence. They expect everything else to justify its
existence, for the elementary notion of good and bad expresses the
attainment or non-attainment of a due measure of perfection; they call a
horse good if it is sound in wind and limb, or the roof of a house bad if
the rain enters in. But to the end or purpose of man himself many do not
give a passing thought. He is in the universe, not knowing why nor
whence, and out of it again “as wind along the waste.”
Those who do not base
their lives on a principle of religion attempt, perhaps, in a more
reflective mood to erect a standard of conduct based on the attainment of
some purpose in life: wealth, domestic happiness, scientific discovery,
social service, philanthropy, or any other worthy object. It is not the
immediate object of this essay to show the essential inadequacy of these
things, nor to establish the supreme truth that in the possession of God
alone is human happiness and perfection to be found. But it is worth
while insisting at the outset that a false idea of the purpose of human
existence, by which we understand that which constitutes the final
perfection and happiness of man, must inevitably lead to a false idea of
the meaning of human evil or sin. It will be conceived by the
humanitarian as an offence against humanity, by the materialist as a kind
of disease, by the cynic as a breach of established conventions. The very
worst thing one might say about it would be that it is inconsistent with
the dignity of a rational being. But once granted that God is the end or
purpose of human life, the true idea of sin becomes apparent. It is an
offense against God.
The Catholic doctrine
on sin and repentance has, for this reason, a more immediate and personal
application to the individual than any other doctrine. For the sinner
does not hurt the immutable God; he hurts only himself by turning away
from his Creator to things created. He introduces into his own being
disorder and discord, and, unless he repents, he will remain for ever
separated from God. Having failed to attain the only purpose of his
existence, he is like a barren tree that is fit for nothing but to be
burnt.
Cardinal Newman tells
us, in one place, how the doctrine of final perseverance brought home to
his mind the existence of two luminously self-evident beings: himself and
the Creator. It is uniquely from the point of view of the relation
between God and the individual soul that we are going to think about sin,
not regarding it as something which brings poverty and misery into the
world in general, but as a supreme evil which impoverishes a human soul by
averting it from God.
There is a further
reason why it is impossible to understand sin except in terms of the
destiny of the individual soul. We have been created by God for himself,
and in nothing short of the possession of God will the desires of our
immortal souls find their ultimate satisfaction. What exactly this union
between our souls and God would have been, had we not been raised to the
supernatural state, is a matter of pure conjecture. A state of natural
beatitude would doubtless have implied some intimate knowledge of God’s
perfections, mirrored in his creatures, and some corresponding degree of
natural felicity, but the unaided powers of our human nature could never
possibly see God as he sees himself, face to face. Such knowledge of God
is altogether above the capabilities of any created nature, even the
nature of the highest angel, for it is the life of God himself. Yet it is
to this sublime and supernatural vision of God, not “through a glass in a
dark manner, but face to face” (1 Cor. xiii 12), that God has destined
us. He has adopted us into his family, given us a share in his own life,
made us partakers of the divine nature (2 Peter I 4).
2. The supernatural state
God, being omnipotent,
could have effected this plan of his divine goodness in many conceivable
ways, but he has revealed to us the way he chose to work this mystery
which has been hidden in God from all eternity. The real Son of God by
nature became man in order that men might become sons of God by adoption;
he deigned to become a sharer in our humanity in order that we might
become sharers in his divinity. In the supernatural order Christ our Lord
is the link between God and man, the only mediator, the firstborn among
many brethren (Rom. viii 29). Through our union with him, branches of one
vine, members of one body, our souls are supernaturalized by sanctifying
grace, a beginning of the final consummation in the vision of God: “He
chose us in him before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy
and unspotted in his sight in charity. Who hath predestined us unto the
adoption of children through Jesus Christ” (Eph. i 4).
In the supernatural
order in which we are placed sin has this effect: it deprives the soul of
sanctifying grace and charity, banishes God who dwells there as in a
temple (1 Cor. iii 16), and leaves the soul empty and desolate, deprived
of its supernatural character as an adopted son of God. “Behold, I stand
at the door, and knock” (Apoc. iii 20). If, in God’s infinite mercy, this
ruined habitation is once again rebuilt and becomes once more the
dwelling-place of God, it will be due to the divine initiative freely
holding out the grace of repentance and converting the rebellious sinner
again to himself.
3. The redemption of Christ
To complete as initial
understanding of sin and repentance, one more reflection is necessary. We
shall attain our last end and happiness as sons of God in being made
conformable to the image of his Son (Rom. viii 29), Jesus Christ our Lord,
in whose hands the Father has given all things (John iii 35). Whether the
Son of God would have become incarnate if sin had not entered the world by
the fall of our first parents, is a matter of theological speculation.
But the fact of sin is certain, and it is equally certain that no created
being could atone for the insult thus offered to the infinite majesty of
God. If divine justice required a satisfaction equal to the offence, it
was necessary for it to be offered by a divine person. From the first
moment of Adam’s sin a Redeemer was promised, whose office and dignity
became more and more clear throughout the ages waiting his coming. When,
in the fullness of time, God appeared in Christ reconciling the world to
himself (2 Cor. v 19), the prophet and priest, the model and king of all
men, he had one supreme work to perform which so predominated in his
sacred life on earth that his name was taken from it: “Thou shalt call his
name JESUS, for he shall save his people from their sins” (Matt. i 21).
We should not even think of sin and its disastrous effects on our own
souls without thinking at the same time of Christ, bearing our
infirmities, stricken like a leper and afflicted, wounded for our
iniquities, bruised for our sins (Isa. liii 4), offering to his Father the
fullest possible satisfaction for the sins of the world by dying on the
Cross.
And if we should not
think of sin apart from Christ’s satisfaction, still less can we even
conceive the grace of repentance, converting the soul again to God, apart
from the merits of Christ, “for there is no other name under heaven given
to men whereby we must be saved” (Acts iv 12). When a sinner is turned
again to God, every step leading up to the infusion of grace is due to the
merits of Christ, “in whom we have redemption, through his blood, the
remission of sins” (Col. i 14).
These essential
notions concerning the purpose of life, the supernatural state to which we
have been raised by grace, and above all the redeeming office of Christ,
are, as it were, the background or setting upon which a more detailed
description of sin and repentance can be placed.
4. The eternal law of God
On these vital
premises we can now proceed a step further. The Summa Theologica of St.
Thomas treats in the first part of God, in the second part of the movement
of the rational creature towards God, and in the third part of Christ who
is the way by which the rational creature reaches God. Man’s movement
towards God, his last end and beatitude, is progressive, stretching over
the whole journey of his earthly life, and on this journey he is assisted
and directed in two ways by his Creator. He is moved internally by divine
grace, for, as we have already recalled, his last end being a supernatural
one, he is unable to attain to it by his own natural power. He is also
directed externally by divine laws which are like signposts on the way.
We must examine more closely this notion of law, because sin is intimately
connected with it. No human being, not even the greatest sinner, directly
and explicitly turns away from God his last end and highest good. He
turns form his last end by turning towards something forbidden by the law
of God. It is a point which is vital to the proper understanding of
mortal sin, and we shall return to it in the next section.
Law is an ordinance of
reason made for the common good and promulgated by the person who has care
of a community. Whatever category of law we may consider, it is always a
reasonable scheme or plan devising means to an end, but the will of the
legislator must “ordain” and impose it on his subjects before the plan can
be called law: the Budget is merely a scheme before it is passed by
Parliament. Law is a plan designed for the good of the whole community,
not merely for the benefit of an individual; in fact, laws frequently
require the individual interest to be sacrificed to the common good.
Moreover, since law gives rise to the obligation of observing it, it must
be promulgated by being brought to the notice of the subject, and cannot
bind unless it is known.
Now, it will be seen
at once that this concept of law refers primarily to God who has care of
the whole universe, and the authority of other legislators, no matter what
the scope of their “community” may be, is derived ultimately from God.
The plan of divine wisdom directing all actions and movements in the whole
universe, including physical laws and animal instincts, is called the
eternal law, and it is the fount and origin of the order in the
universe.
5. The natural law
We are concerned now
only with the laws of God governing and directing human beings. How are
they promulgated and brought to our notice? We think at once of the
Mosaic law, of the law of the Gospel instituted and promulgated by Christ
“Rex et Legifer Noster,” of the laws of the Church made by Councils and
Popes under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, of the just laws of States,
of the regulations of religious Orders and other smaller communities.
But, as a matter of
fact, there is a law of God governing human beings, which is antecedent to
any of those we have mentioned and of far greater obligation, which was
binding on the Gentiles, who had never heard of the law of Moses (Rom. ii
14), and to which all men are subject even though they recognize neither
the law of the Gospel, nor the authority of the Church, nor the ruling of
the State. It is called the natural law, the participation and
reflection in a rational creature of the eternal law of God, and therefore
an expression in man of the very essence of God. God was free not to
create human nature at all, but having created it he could not but assign
to it the moral or natural law. Every created thing has certain
well-defined tendencies proper to its nature, and man is no exception to
this rule. Unlike the instincts and tendencies of irrational things, the
law which governs human nature is law in the strict sense of the word, for
the individual is able to obey or disobey, and is not driven along by
blind inherent force. The endowment of free will, necessarily
accompanying a rational nature, is man’s peril as well as his chief glory,
for in freely disregarding the laws of his own nature he is responsible
for the resulting ruin and disorder.
This law of his being
is called the natural law because it can be perceived by the light of
reason alone, and because its precepts can be deduced by reason from the
data of human nature. To analyze and explain the natural moral law is the
purpose of the science of ethics, and we cannot do more than indicate the
broad lines of the process. We fine from the experience of our own nature
that a human being is a complicated organism having many faculties and
tendencies and needs. In the interplay of these various parts a certain
subordination of the lower to the higher, of the parts to the whole, and
of the whole to God, is clearly observed. Let us take a few examples. It
is morally wrong to satisfy the desire for food and drink in a way which
causes grave harm to the whole body or which obscures the use of reason.
Certain faculties, as the power of procreation, having a natural purpose
and natural organs for that purpose, it is morally wrong to pervert this
purpose by sexual vice. Human nature is social and needs the society of
other human beings; all those things are therefore morally wrong which
would make the maintenance of human society impossible; for example,
anarchy or theft. Lastly, human reason can establish the existence of God
the Creator and ruler of the universe, a good and beneficent and sapient
Being: that blasphemy and hatred of God are morally wrong is a necessary
consequence.
In a word, the
substance of the Decalogue, with the exception of the third commandment,
is nothing more than a written expression of the natural law. If I tell a
man to live according to his nature, to develop his faculties harmoniously
in accordance with their natural objects, and to live in a manner
befitting the dignity of a human being, I am merely telling him to obey
the natural law which is a reflection in his nature of the eternal law of
God. In telling a man to do good and avoid evil, I am telling him not to
break the commandments of God. The two sets of ideas are mutually
inclusive.
All this is the
natural law. But man is raised to a supernatural state, and in everything
which concerns the attainment of his supernatural end, human reason alone
is powerless to discover the laws which God has devised for his guidance.
He needs to be taught by God. Christ our Lord, who taught the way of God
in truth (Matt. xxii 16), has brought to our knowledge the necessity of
Baptism and of faith and all the other precepts of the Gospel, and the
Church continues to teach in his name.
But there is this
further important observation to make: even with regard to the natural
obligations of the moral law it is necessary for the majority of men to be
taught by God; for human reason left to itself will discover the truth, at
least in the less obvious precepts of he natural law, only with such labor
and difficulty that very few men would come to the knowledge of it.
Therefore, the Catholic is taught by the Church his natural duties, and in
matters of great moment and difficulty the teaching authority of the
Church defines the moral obligations of the faithful; for example, in the
use of marriage. That teaching imposed on the whole Church is infallibly
true, for it bears the stamp of divine authority.
6. Definition of sin
Sufficient has been
said to show the meaning of divine law, the breach of which is sin.
Inasmuch as every species of just law is reduced to the eternal law of God
as its fount and origin, the aptness of the classical Augustinian
definition of sin is apparent: “Sin is any thought, word, or deed against
the eternal law, which is the divine ordinance of reason commanding order
to be observed and forbidding its disturbance” (Migne, P.L.xlii 48). It
is against this majestic ordinance of God that man dares to act in setting
aside the natural law, or the law of the Church, or any other just law.
But he cannot evade altogether the eternal law of God “commanding order to
be observed,” and it is of Catholic faith that the order of divine justice
may require the eternal punishment of the sinner.
We may now make a
closer examination of mortal sin. In order to avoid confusion and
misunderstanding, we must remember that the word “sin” may be employed in
various senses; we speak of “original” sin, of “mortal” sin, and of
“venial” sin. Confusion will arise if we allow ourselves to think of
these three terms as if they denoted three kinds or species of one genus,
in rather the same way as we speak of any three sacraments sharing in the
generic notion of eternal signs causing grace. The full nature of sin, in
the sense employed throughout this essay, with the exception of the last
section, is found only in personal mortal sin; original sin
and venial sin share in that nature only incompletely and
analogously. The complete malice and disastrous effects of sin are proper
to personal mortal sin and to nothing else. It is the action by which a
man knowingly and freely turns from God by fixing his will on creature.
How it is that an offense against the law of God necessarily entails the
rejection of God will be explained more fully in the following section.
II.
MORTAL SIN
1.
The end of the law
The eternal law directs
rational creatures towards their last end and perfection in God. It is a
union which will reach its final consummation in the vision of God face to
face, and in this life consists in the mutual love between God and the
soul, charity, the bond of perfection (Col. iii 14). The end of
the law, therefore, is God, to be loved by the rational creature as his
sovereign good, to whom every created good must be subordinated. Hence
follows this important consequence: willfully to disobey that law is to
prefer some created finite satisfaction to the infinite uncreated good
which is God. To disobey God’s law is to show by one’s actions that God’s
will and good pleasure are not the predominant motive of one’s life. He
who sins grievously implicitly declares: “I know that by this action I am
forfeiting God’s friendship; nevertheless I do it.” What else is this
than to prefer the creature to the Creator, one’s own gratification to the
express will of God, self-love to the love of God” “The end of the
commandment is charity” (1 Tim. I 5).
2.
Sin the rejection of
God
This might appear, at
first sight, an exaggeration. It might be objected that the sinner does
not weigh up the relative merits of the Creator and the creature, and
decide in favor of the creature. He desires, indeed, to do something
which he knows to be forbidden, but he does not regard it as his sovereign
good and the sole end of his existence. No sinner directly intends to
turn away from God. Such an act would be, in fact, impossible, for the
human will necessarily turns towards its highest good and happiness: even
a sin like the hatred of God is an aversion not from man’s last end, but
from God considered under some such aspect as the avenger of evil, and
therefore conceived as harmful.
The answer to this
objection is that the twofold element in every mortal sin, namely, the
rejection of God and adherence to creatures, inevitably coincides in one
act of the human will. Self-love and self-gratification in the forbidden
enjoyment of creatures is the direct and immediate object of the will.
The rejection of God is willed indirectly as involved in the choice of a
sinful object. Theoretically the sinner may admit that the
self-indulgence which he contemplates is shameful, that it is unworthy of
a rational creature’s desire, and that God’s friendship is the only good
infinitely desirable. Yet, in practice, he acts as though he
regarded that self-indulgence as more desirable than God’s friendship,
since, in order to enjoy the creature, he is willing to forfeit the love
of the Creator. By directly choosing the enjoyment of some created good
known to be mortally sinful, the sinner elects to disturb the moral order
of God to the extent of losing the divine friendship. He does not want to
turn from God, you will say. He does so in turning to a creature, and he
does so as deliberately and as inevitably as he who desiring to turn his
face to the east therefore turns his back to the west. “They said,
reasoning with themselves: The time of our life is short and tedious . . .
and no man hath been known to return from hell. . . . Come therefore, and
let us enjoy the good things that are present . . . let us fill ourselves
with costly wine . . . let us oppress the poor just man, and not spare the
widow . . . let our strength be the law of justice. . . . These things
they thought, and were deceived: for their own malice blinded them, and
they knew not the secrets of God” (Wisd. ii).
It is because of this
double aspect in every mortal sin that its nature can be described in a
twofold way. The essential element which makes sin the greatest possible
evil in the world is the rejection of God, the love of self carried to the
extent of treating God with contempt, the averting of the will from God by
a voluntary recourse to creatures. In this respect all mortal sins are
alike. But if we desire to discuss the relative gravity of different
mortal sins, or to discover some process by which sins may be grouped into
different categories or species, we must turn our attention to the
positive aspect of sin, and consider the various finite objects for the
sake of which God may have been rejected.
3.
Distinction of sins
It is in this sense that
the familiar Augustinian definition, given in the previous section, is to
be understood. The difference between one mortal sin and another can only
turn on the degree and nature of the subversion of the moral order, on the
variety of thought, word, or deed against the eternal law of God. In each
case the sinful act carries with it the forfeiture of God’s friendship,
loss of grace, spiritual death. A man is dead whether he has been dead a
day, a week, or a year, whether he died by violence or disease, in youth
or in old age; but in each case the cause of death may be differently
reckoned and determined. So it is possible for a human being willfully to
forsake God in various ways, according to the manner in which he departs
from his law. Theft is an injury done to my neighbor, suicide is an
injury done to myself, but each is an offence against God, because each is
forbidden, though for different reasons, by the divine law.
We shall see in a later
section that the act of repentance reflects this double aspect of sin.
Just as sin is the averting of the will from God by a voluntary recourse
to creatures, so repentance implies conversion to God accompanied by an
act of the will detesting the sin committed. It is because this
detestation of sin is an absolutely necessary condition for reconciliation
to God’s friendship that the Church requires us to confess, in number and
species, every mortal sin of which we are conscious.
But are we to suppose
that every breach of God’s law is so serious as to deprive us of God’s
friendship? Not so. We have already insisted that the full nature of sin
is verified in mortal sin alone. There is a type of sin which is called
“venial,” and in a later section a fuller analysis of its nature will be
given. For the present we are speaking only of mortal sin, an act so
grievously subversive of the moral order as to destroy the friendship
existing between the soul and God, and to frustrate the end of the moral
law, which is the due subordination of all created good to God, the
infinite and sovereign good.
4.
Grave matter
Before we can say with
any degree of certainty that mortal sin has been committed, the action
must objectively constitute a serious breach of the law of God. Is
there any method whereby this may be determined? A Catholic, of course,
accepts the authority of the Church in defining the moral law, and the
Church, in fact, has frequently settled disputes among the faithful by an
authoritative decision: for example, Innocent XI declared that the
voluntary omission of Mass on days of obligation was a grave sin. There
is also the very clear teaching contained in certain texts of Holy
Scripture to the effect that certain evil actions exclude the doer from
the kingdom of God (1 Cor. vi 10), or are worthy of eternal punishment
(Matt. xxv 41), or cry to heaven for vengeance (Deut. xxiv 15).
Human reason alone,
grated the nature of mortal sin as destructive of the moral order and
disruptive of the love of God, can establish that certain disordered
actions are of this nature. Charity is the friendship existing between
God and man. Even in human intercourse there are actions which merely
ruffle the surface of friendship, and there are others which are
calculated to destroy it altogether. So also on the plane of divine
charity, it is clear that a man cannot remain the friend of God while
blaspheming him, or refusing to believe his revelation, or declining to
trust in his promises. And because the order of divine charity requires
us to love others for God’s sake as we love ourselves, it is equally clear
that this order of fraternal charity cannot exist among men in the face of
certain grave injuries committed by one man against another. On this
double precept of charity the whole moral law depends (Matt. xxii 40).
Mortal sins will also
differ in gravity as compared with one another. Inasmuch as our whole
lives are directed by the eternal law in order to bring us to the
possession of God, a sin such as blasphemy must be extremely grave,
because it is a much greater disturbance of the established order to
insult the Creator than to offend his creatures. Similarly, if we
consider the moral order imposed on man as a social being, the more
precious my neighbor’s rights are, the more grievous is their violation;
taking an innocent life is a graver injury than stealing property.
It is on this basis of
reason applied to the data of revelation that the exponents of moral
theology argue that certain actions are to be considered as grave sin, and
when there is substantial agreement between them on points which may be a
little difficult to determine, the faithful can accept their teaching as
certain. For the common theological teaching, owing to its practical
influence on the use of the sacrament of Penance, is, in effect, the
common teaching of the Church. But even the most careful enquiry often
fails to secure certainty, owing to the complexity of the matter and the
divergent views tolerated by the Church.
5. Advertence and consent
So far we have examined
the subject, so to speak, objectively. But before any action can be
considered as gravely sinful, not merely considered abstractly, but
subjectively on the part of any particular individual, it is necessary
for the individual conscience to appreciate that the action is morally
wrong.
Conscience is a judgment
of the mind, based on habitual knowledge, that an action is in conformity
with the law of God or not. We cannot, in this place, discuss the many
important questions concerning judgments of conscience which may be based
on erroneous premises, or be the result of invincible ignorance or
scrupulosity. It would take us too far afield, and is not really
necessary for a proper understanding of the act of sin. We will assume
that the mind has formed a judgment that a proposed action is gravely
sinful, in the sense that a serious obligation is involved, and that this
decision is not warped by inculpable ignorance or by an abnormal mental
condition.
Now, in order that a
person may commit a grave sin, that is, an act for which the individual
sinner must be held responsible, it is clearly requisite that the will
should give consent to the evil, for without free consent there can be no
responsibility. It is precisely on this point that doubts and
difficulties often arise, especially in sins of thought. The matter is
essentially one for the individual to settle for himself, though a prudent
confessor can be of great assistance in removing erroneous notions and
irrelevant issues, and in helping a person to resolve the doubts which may
have arisen on the score of consent, by steering a safe path between
scrupulosity and laxity. We can at least see this: the consent of the
will is necessarily bound up with, and measured by, the degree of mental
awareness or advertence existing at the moment. In a practical issue of
such vital importance as mortal sin, the consent must be reckoned
insufficient unless it is accompanied by that degree of advertence which
is required for any other serious matter in human life. No one could be
held bound, at least in conscience, to the terms of a contract which he
had signed when half asleep, or when his mind was wandering, or when his
judgment was unbalanced by the stress of a strong emotion which he had
neither desired nor caused. Similarly no one can commit a mortal sin in
these circumstances.
6. Temptation
We will suppose, then,
that the requisite knowledge and advertence are present; in other words,
that a person knows a proposed action to be gravely forbidden by the law
of God, even though the reasons for the prohibitions are only vaguely
perceived; and, secondly, that he adverts to this knowledge, even though
the consequent effects of mortal sin are not fully appreciated at the
moment. The human will is now, as we say, being “temped” to commit sin,
and the temptation may arise either from the attractions of the world, or
from the desires of our own bodies—the law in our members always fighting
against the law of God (Rom. vii 23)—or from the instigation of the enemy
of mankind.
Faced with the
temptation to commit sin, the will may take one of two courses. The evil
suggestion may be rejected and repudiated. It may return again and again,
even daily, throughout the course of our earthly life, and be rejected
again and again. In this there is no sin, but heroic virtue. God allows
it, “that it may appear whether you love him with all your heart and all
your soul” (Deut. xiii 3). These temptations are the blows of the hammer
and chisel forming in our souls the image of Christ, the measure of our
ultimate enjoyment of the vision of God: “Blessed is the man that endureth
temptation: for, when he hath been proved, he shall receive the crown of
life which God hath promised to them that love him” (Jas. i 12).
Or, on the other hand,
with the mind fully adverting to the evil of the suggestion, the will may
elect to adopt it. At that moment mortal sin is committed. The cause of
this disaster is not God (Ps. v 5; Jas I 13), nor the devil, whom we are
able to resist “strong in faith” (1 Peter v 9), but the human will, which
has freely chosen to transgress the divine law, and by that action has
turned away from God its last end and happiness.
The sinful action has
been committed and, perhaps, completely forgotten by the sinner. But,
until he co-operates with the grace of repentance, the effects of that
mortal sin remain in his soul, disfiguring its supernatural beauty and
perfection, and making it worthy of eternal punishment. “How is the gold
become dim, the finest color changed, . . . the noble sons of Sion
esteemed as earthen vessel” (Lam. iv 1). We have now to examine the state
of the soul which has so lamentably fallen.
III.
THE STATE OF SIN
In the present section we
shall examine a little more closely the effects caused in the soul by
mortal sin, for we can obtain a fuller idea of the nature of any cause by
considering its effects. Mortal sin is a free act of the will by which we
discard the love of God and cease to be united to him as our sovereign
good. Within this idea of freely rejecting the friendship of God is
contained everything we can say about the subsequent state of sin. These
consequences are, doubtless, not always fully realized by the person who
sins, but a little reflection on the data of revelation will bring them
more clearly before the mind: “Know thou and see that it is an evil and a
bitter thing for thee to have left the Lord thy God” (Jer. Ii 19).
1. Guilt and stain
The rejection of God,
which is sin, is an act performed by a free and responsible agent. The
act once committed, the sinner remains in a permanent or habitual state of
guilt or responsibility for the evil he has done in offending God, and,
inasmuch as sin is a breach of the divine law, he incurs also the
liability of being punished in order to repair the moral order violated by
sin.
Passing over, for the
moment, the question of punishment, we must explain in more detail all
that is implied in the state of a soul guilty of mortal sin. For, in the
language of Holy Scripture, the word “sinner” is applied to men not only
at the moment in which the offence was committed, but afterwards, as a
description of their condition of soul, a state which remains until the
offence has been forgiven. It is a consequence of sin which is perfectly
intelligible , and is evident even in the offences committed by one man
against another. The offence and the insult offered to God remain as
something imputed to the sinner until reparation has been made. Mortal
sin is the turning away from God, and this state must remain until the
sinner turns once more to him.
Now, to appreciate what
this condition of imputability or guilt entails, we must bear in mind that
God has raised us to a supernatural state, endowing our souls with
sanctifying grace, making us adopted sons of God, temples of the Holy
Spirit, and sharers of the divine nature. Accompanying this free gift of
God are the infused virtues and, above, all the virtue of charity, through
which we are united to God by supernatural love. Had man not been raised
to this supernatural state, grievous sin would not have caused in his soul
any kind of privation. But in the present supernatural order the soul is
not united to God unless it is in a state of grace and friendship with
him, and, therefore, the state of enmity with God means the loss of
sanctifying grace and charity.
It is a deprivation
often referred to in Holy Scripture as a stain on the soul (Jos. xxii 17),
filthiness (Isa. iv 4), uncleanness (Zach. iii 3), from which we must be
washed by God in clean water (Ezech. xxxvi 25) and in the blood of Christ
(Apoc. i 5). The phrases are used metaphorically, but they convey an
accurate idea of the state of a soul in mortal sin. “Corruptio optimi
pessima”: the better a thing is, the worse is its state of corruption. A
corrupted animal is worse than a corrupted plant; a dead human body is
more unpleasant to look upon than the body of an animal; a corrupted human
soul must be the most ghastly thing in creation except a fallen angel.
Uncleanness is a term which applies strictly only to material things, and
it is caused by a pure and clean object coming into contact with something
that defiles it. The beauty of a human soul consists in the natural light
of reason, and, still more, in the supernatural light of divine grace. By
mortal sin it is brought into contact with created things forbidden by the
law of God, and by this contact becomes stained and defiled. It is a
state of soul which can be considered as the darkness or shadow caused by
an object, personal guilt, which is obscuring the light; the light of
grace is restored to the soul by God’s forgiveness of the personal offence
which has caused the loss of his friendship. Hence, owing to the intimate
connection between the loss of grace and the habitual guilt consequent on
personal mortal sin, it is absolutely impossible for one mortal sin to be
forgiven unless the guilt of every mortal sin which a sinner may have
committed is also removed.
2. Debt of eternal punishment
Closely allied to the
permanent state of guilt consequent on mortal sin is the debt of
undergoing punishment for the sin committed. It is a debt, indeed, which
the sinner may not be called upon actually to pay, since both sin and
punishment may be remitted in this life through the mercy and goodness of
God; but every sin infallibly carries with it the liability of paying a
penalty proportionate to the offence.
Every law must have a
sanction attached to its non-observance, and it is in the nature of things
that anyone who acts against an established order is repressed by the
principle of the order against which he acts. An offence against the
military law is punished by military authority; non-observance of the law
of the State is punished by the civil power; a sin against the moral order
of God must necessarily be punished by God (The loss of grace being the
immediate effect of mortal sin necessarily involves eternal separation
from God, should the sinner die unrepentant. In this sense mortal sin is
its own punishment. But it is essential to keep well in the foreground
the idea of punishment as a penalty exacted and inflicted by God in
vindication of the moral order which has been violated. Grace is a free
gift of God, and, if a soul is deprived of it, the consequence of that
deprival is a punishment inflicted by the author of grace). The
punishment of mortal sin is twofold, thus corresponding to the two
elements involved in mortal sin. To the rejection of God corresponds the
pain of loss, and to the inordinate recourse to creatures
corresponds the pain of sense. “Depart from me, you cursed, into
everlasting fire” (Matt. xxv 41). The eternity of hell, so clearly taught
in Holy Scripture, arises from the fact that the loss of grace is
irreparable, as far as the sinner is concerned, and also from the doctrine
that there can be no repentance after death (Cf. Essay xxxiii,
Eternal Punishment). The debt of punishment, therefore, remains as
long as the will is turned away from God. The sinner has indulged his own
will in seeking a created good, and justice demands that the violated
order should be satisfied by his suffering something against his will in
punishment. In breaking the eternal law of God he does not, and cannot,
escape from it.
3. Temporal punishment
The liability to eternal
punishment is an inevitable accompaniment of the act of sin, and the
knowledge of it helps the mind to understand, not only the malice of sin,
but the mercy of God, who shows his omnipotence in sparing us. Let us for
a moment anticipate the doctrine to be explained in the next section, and
assume that by repentance the sinner is again converted to God’s
friendship. The guilt is forgiven and the stain of sin removed from his
soul by the infusion of sanctifying grace. As a consequence the liability
to eternal punishment, contracted by the guilt of sin, is
completely removed, but it does not follow that the repentant sinner is
freed from the debt of some temporal punishment. By mortal sin
both justice and friendship have been violated. With the infusion of
divine grace and charity the soul is restored to God’s love and
friendship, but the debt of punishment due to the divine justice remains
to be paid, not in eternity—for eternal separation from God is
inconsistent with being in a state of friendship with him—but in time.
The same is true of human friendship which has been broken off by some act
of injustice on the part of one man against another. The offence may be
forgiven by the injured person and friendship restored, but there remains
the obligation of making adequate reparation for the injustice, by
restoring, for example, stolen property.
The sinner may escape
the actual infliction of temporal punishment, but the debt is infallibly
contracted by the sinner, and it is for this reason that an undertaking to
make satisfaction to God is an integral part of the act of repentance. It
is important to remember that when we speak of temporal punishment as an
obligation infallibly and, as it were, automatically incurred, the
statement is strictly true only with reference to punishment, at least, in
a future state. The word “temporal” is not to be understood necessarily
of this life, for it is a fact of experience that the wicked in this world
often live in great happiness: “their houses are secure and peaceable,
their children dance and play, they spend their days in wealth” (Job xxi
9-13); so much so that the rest of us who, rightly or wrongly, conceive
ourselves as just, may be disturbed at the prosperity of sinners (Ps.
lxxii 3).
The inevitable nature of
the penalty exacted for sin arises from a consideration of the divine
justice. In his mercy God may accept the vicarious satisfaction of
others, and has given to the Church power to remit temporal punishment by
applying to individuals the merits of Christ and the saints as
satisfaction for their sins (Cf. Essay xxvii, The Sacrament of
Penance). We can be absolutely certain that the obligation of
undergoing eternal punishment is entirely remitted when grace is infused
into the soul of a repentant sinner, but to what extent our debt of
temporal punishment is also remitted we do not, and cannot, know with
certainty. As for the sufferings of this life, a Christian tries to bear
them patiently as making him more conformable to the image of Christ (Rom.
viii 29), and he asks God to accept them as part of the satisfaction due
to his sins.
These two things, the
state of guilt and the liability to punishment, are the chief effects of
sin in the sinner. The state of soul we have described would follow upon
one mortal sin, and it is called by theologians habitual sin in
order to distinguish it, as something lasting and permanent, from “actual
sin” which is the sinful act. We have not used the term because it is
liable to be confused with the “habit of sinning,” or the inclination to
fall into repeated sins from the force of habit.
4. Human nature wounded
But we cannot examine
the effects of sin without including amongst them the “wounds” suffered by
our human nature, primarily as a result of original sin, but also, with
due proportion, in consequence of every actual sin committed (Rom. viii
29). The essential principles of our human nature remain intact, but our
natural inclination to virtue becomes weakened by sin. That inclination
itself will never be entirely uprooted, but we are so constituted that
repeated acts of vice form in us an increasing facility or habit in
respect of those acts. This is, indeed, an evident and a most lamentable
effect of sin upon the sinner, and man knows from experience that after
repeated sins the understanding becomes blind to its evil, the will is
hardened in malice, resistance is weakened, and passion becomes more
unruly. But no matter to what extent the sinner may be “wounded” in this
way, whether by his own sins, or by hereditary tendencies due to the sins
of his fathers, the essential principles of his nature are not corrupted,
and he is able, with God’s grace, to surmount these obstacles and lead a
life of heroic sanctity.
5. Other consequences
Such are the effects of
sin on the sinner. But in our journey towards God we are not walking
alone, we are members of one body of which Christ is the head. We must
remember the effect of sin on the passion and death of Christ our Lord, a
reflection which can easily lead to perfect contrition. The sins of the
world, including our own sins, were the cause of all the sufferings of
Christ. One act of God made man would have been sufficient to satisfy the
justice of God, but Christ was not content with anything short of a
perfect expression of love for men, and there is no more complete sign of
love for others than laying down one’s life for them. So St. Paul speaks
of the sin of apostasy as “crucifying again the son of God, making him a
mockery” (Heb. vi 6).
Closely connected with
this aspect of sin, on which every Christian loves to dwell, is the
affront which sin offers to the mystical body of Christ, the organic union
of all the faithful united to Christ their head by sanctifying grace.
For, sin being the deprivation of grace, the sinner is a dead and useless
member of this body, a withered branch of this vine. It is for this
reason, perhaps, that in the Confiteor we acknowledge our guilt not
only to God, but to our Lady, the Apostles, and all the saints. For the
sinner has disfigured the body of Christ, the Church, which God desires to
be pure and glorious, “not having in it spot or wrinkle or any such thing,
but that it should be holy and without blemish” (Eph. v 27).
Enough has been said
about the state of sin and its effects to enable the mind to understand
that it is the greatest of all evils in a human being. Just as honor is
measured by the dignity of the person who gives honor, so is an insult
measured by the dignity of the person insulted. In this sense sin is an
infinite offence against the majesty of God.
If the knowledge we
possess, from reason and from revelation, concerning the evil of sin, is
to be a living force in regulating our own lives, we must, by continual
meditation and reflection, bring it home to our minds. It is one thing to
understand the meaning of sin, and view it with abhorrence in general, and
say with David, “As the Lord liveth, the man that hath done this thing is
a child of death” (2 Kings xii 5-7). It is another thing to hear the
accusing voice of the prophet saying to us individually, “though art the
man,” and to see our own sins passing before our eyes, each an object of
our own creation and belonging to us more intimately than any other of our
possessions. The personal realization of sin is the first preliminary to
repentance. Before the prodigal son in a far country was inspired to rise
again and return to his father, he had first to realize his want and
hunger, and to discover that his sins had degraded him to the level of
swine (Luke xv 11).
IV.
REPENTANCE
The vital element in
every movement of man towards God is its supernatural character. Our
final perfection and happiness in the vision of God is beyond the
capabilities of any created nature, unless raised and assisted by divine
grace. A sinful action which averts our souls from God entails the loss
of sanctifying grace, and the return to God’s friendship implies a
reinstatement, a reinfusion of that same grace which makes us sons of God
and joint heirs with Christ.
1. Initial divine movement
It is not our purpose,
in this place, to study the Catholic doctrine on grace (Cf. Essays
xvi and xvii), but, in order to understand the meaning of repentance, we
must at least realize that although the human will is the cause of the
loss of grace by mortal sin, yet the human will cannot, of its own power,
repair the disaster and restore the intimate friendship with God which sin
has forfeited. Such would be contrary to the whole concept of “grace” as
something freely bestowed upon us by God.
The first movement of
repentance comes not from the sinner, but from God: “If anyone says that
without the previous inspiration of the Holy Ghost, and without his help,
man . . . can repent him, let him be anathema” (Council of Trent, sess.
vi, can. 3). The mercy of God anticipates our own human action in
returning to him: “Convert us, O Lord, to thee, and we shall be converted”
(Heb. xi 6). Illuminated by this divine action, we make an act of faith
in God (Lam v 21), even though it be merely an act of faith in the
existence of hell. Then, realizing that we are sinners and hoping to
obtain the divine mercy, we begin to have some initial love of God as the
fountain of all justice, and because our sins have offended God we hate
and detest them (Cf. Catechism of the Council of Trent, Part II,
chap. v, q. 8; Council of Trent, sess. vi, chap. 6).
The hatred and
detestation of sin, the meaning of which is to be explained in this
present section, is a necessary disposition in the sinner before he can
possibly obtain forgiveness of his sins and be restored to the grace and
friendship of God. For, although it is of Catholic faith that the first
movement of repentance comes from God, it is equally of Catholic faith
that the human will must freely co-operate with the divine action. “If
anyone saith that man’s free will, moved and excited by God, by assenting
to the divine movement and inspiration does not co-operate towards
disposing and preparing itself for the grace of justification . . . let
him be anathema” (Council of Trent, sess. vi, can. 4). The actual grace
of God, given to us solely through the merits of Christ our Lord, is
necessary for disposing the soul to be received again into the friendship
of God as an adopted son; the free movement of the human will hating and
detesting sin is also indispensable.
2. Detestation of sin
In the present section
we have to examine all that is involved in this act of detesting sin,
which, from whatever motive it may arise, and whether made in sacramental
confession or not, is called “repentance.” It is an act which disposes
the sinner to receive complete forgiveness, and it is simply as a
predisposing condition to the infusion of grace that we now consider it.
In the next section we shall see how this act of repentance leads to
complete forgiveness and the infusion of grace, either through sacramental
absolution or as a result of what is known as an act of perfect
contrition, carrying with it at least an implicit desire for the
sacrament.
If repentance is to have
any value as a salutary act, that is to say, as contributing to the
restoration of grace in the soul, it must consist of sorrow and
detestation for our past sins as offences against the law of God,
accompanied by the resolution to amend our lives and make satisfaction.
Its chief characteristic, and one upon which all the others turn, is the
voluntary detestation of , or aversion from, the sin committed. The
doctrine of the early Protestant reformer, which is doubtless held by many
non-Catholics at the present day, placed the chief element of repentance,
not in the act of the will deliberately detesting sin, but rather in the
change of mind by which a sinner, from being in a state of terror and
remorse, now believes or trusts that his sins have been remitted through
the mediation of Christ (Cf. Council of Trent, sess. xiv, can. 4).
They regarded dwelling on the sins of the past, in order to detest them,
and especially reflection on the state of sin with its liability to
eternal punishment, as useless sorrow and hypocrisy (Ibid., can.
5). Consequently the whole stress in the idea of repentance was placed on
leading a new life, to the exclusion of making satisfaction, whether
voluntarily undertaken or imposed by the Church, for the sins of the past
(Cf. Council of Trent, sess. vi, can. 13).
Quite apart from any
consideration of the teaching of Holy Scripture, it will be seen that the
Catholic doctrine is a logical and necessary deduction from the nature of
sin, as we have already explained it, and it is evident also from an
analogy with human friendship which has been broken off by a grave and
deliberate offense. The sinner, having rejected God to find satisfaction
in created things, cannot hope for forgiveness unless he first detests
that which has been the cause of his separation from God, or is at least
prepared to detest it as soon as it is recalled to his memory. If the
evil of sin is understood, detestation of it is accompanied by sorrow when
once we recognize either that the evil is actually present, or that it has
been present at some time or other in our lives. The resolution to change
one’s life is excellent, and is necessarily involved in the act of
repentance; but how is it possible to elect to change one’s life, in the
sense of avoiding sin, without at the same time realizing that our former
life was evil, and, if evil, a matter for detestation and sorrow?
So the great penitents
in Holy Scripture are shown to us sorrowing and detesting their sins as a
necessary prelude to the resolution of leading a new life and of making
satisfaction. “I know my iniquity, and my sin is always before me . . . a
contrite and humble heart, O God, thou wilt not despise” (Ps. 1 5, 19),
“The soul that is sorrowful for the greatness of the evil she hath done .
. . giveth glory and justice to thee” (Baruch ii 18). “I am confounded
and ashamed because I have borne the reproach of my youth” (Jer. xxxi
19). In the New Testament, the tears of Peter (Luke xxii 62) and Magdalen
(Luke vii 44) and the grief of the prodigal son (Luke xv 21), are familiar
examples of true repentance.
3. Purpose of amendment and
satisfaction
Into this act of
detestation and sorrow for sin there necessarily enters a resolution to
amend one’s life in the future, and to make whatever satisfaction the
justice of God may require. We must not conceive the detestation of sin
and the purpose of amendment and of making satisfaction as three entirely
separate elements in repentance; they are so joined and connected that one
is not present unless the others enter, at least implicitly, into the act;
that is to say, if a person is truly sorry for his past sins, he
necessarily undertakes to amend his life and make satisfaction, even
though he does not at the moment directly advert to these obligations.
For it is impossible for the sinner really to detest sin unless at the
same time he undertakes to avoid it in future. Similarly detestation of
sin implies a realization of responsibility in deliberately breaking the
law of God. In sinning against God we are sinning against the legislator
who has attached a sanction to his laws, both as a deterrent from future
sin, and as part of the order of his eternal justice. In the previous
section sufficient has been said about this liability to punishment
incurred by the sinner, and there is no need to refer to the subject
again. But, concerning the true sorrow and the true purpose of amendment
which are involved in repentance, there still remain some necessary
observation to make.
4. Qualities of true repentance
and amendment
In the first place, the
reason for which sin is detested must be in some way concerned with God
against whom sin has been committed. It would be therefore altogether
inadequate for a person to detest sin because it results in such
consequences as the loss of reputation, or bodily disease; but any
salutary motive suffices. Reflections on the disorder of the state of
sin, the fear of God’s punishment, even on the temporal punishment of this
world, provided they are conceived in the light of faith as being
inflicted by God in vindication of his justice, are adequate motives.
Still more, such considerations as the effect of sin on the passion of
Christ, the contempt and ingratitude and rebellion against God, and all
the deformity involved in acting against his eternal law, are excellent
motives for detesting sin. The supreme motive is to base our repentance
on the love of God for his own sake, the act known as perfect contrition,
which is the subject of the next section.
It is necessary, in
addition, that the sinner should detest sin “above all things,” as we say
in the act of contrition. This does not mean that we must have
feelings of sorrow and repulsion regarding sin greater than our
feelings with regard to any other evil; for repentance proceeds
essentially from the intellect and will, although it generally happens
that our emotions share in the sorrow elicited, and there is a prayer in
the liturgy asking for the gift of tears to bewail our sins. The phrase
“above all things” means that in the judgment of the intellect we estimate
sin to be greater than any other evil, and as a consequence of this
intellectual judgment the will detests sin more than any other evil. Such
a judgment and consequent detestation must necessarily follow from all
that has been said about sin and its effects.
It is not only
unnecessary, but altogether imprudent and unwise, to attempt to test the
sincerity of this judgment by making comparisons between the evil of sin
and the evil of undergoing some terrible torture, and asking whether the
torture would be chosen rather than the sin. For an imminent sensible
evil causes more vehement feelings of fear at the moment, and may
interfere with the judgment of the mind. It is sufficient to prefer any
evil in general to the evil of sin, without descending to particular
comparison. “The contrite sinner,” says St. Thomas, “must in general be
prepared to suffer any pain rather than commit sin, but he is not bound to
make a particular comparison between this pain or that pain. On the
contrary, it is foolish to question oneself or other persons on the choice
that would be made if confronted with any particular suffering” (Quodlibet.,
I, art. Ix; Parma, vol. ix, p. 465).
The detestation of which
we are speaking must extend to each and every mortal sin we have
committed. For each of them, taken singly, has grievously offended God;
each one is sufficient of itself to cause the loss of grace and divine
friendship. We have already seen that it is impossible for one mortal sin
to be forgiven without the others, since in the supernatural order the
remission of sin is equivalent to the infusion of grace into the soul. If
the soul remains unrepentant of one mortal sin, it is not yet disposed for
the infusion of grace. One must be careful not to misunderstand the
meaning of this doctrine. God does not expect us to do what is morally
impossible. Our sorrow is held to extend to all the mortal sins we have
committed, even if, after a reasonable examination of conscience, some
sins may have escaped our memory. Moreover, as will be explained in the
next section, the act of perfect charity, by which the soul loves God
above all things and for his own sake, so disposes the soul with regard to
its last end, that it would at once detest any sin which is recalled to
the memory, even though, when the act of perfect charity was made, the
sinner did not explicitly think of any particular past sin. Detestation
of sin is implicitly contained in the act of perfect charity.
To turn now to the
purpose of amendment, it will be perceived at once that, if sorrow for
past sin really has all the fullness which we have attempted to analyze,
it must necessarily follow that the will at the same time undertakes to
avoid that sin in the future. In very many cases of true repentance the
mind does not advert explicitly to the purpose of amendment: it is
contained implicitly within the act of sorrow and detestation, and it
would be unnecessarily rigorous to require it to be made explicitly in
each case. Why, then, must we subject the matter to a still further
examination? Because the detestation of past sin and the purpose of
amendment are so closely connected that, especially in cases of repeated
sin, the purpose of amendment may be an indication of the sincerity of our
sorrow.
For this reason it is
advisable always to make it explicitly as we find it in the formula of the
act of contrition. Moreover, whenever a repentant sinner, looking into
the future, foresees the possibility of repeating the offense, the
omission of an explicit resolution to avoid it might argue an insufficient
detestation of his sin.
Let us try to see more
exactly all that is implied in this resolution. The will must firmly
elect to suffer any evil in general rather than offend God again, either
by the same offense or in any other way. At the time of repentance it is
possible by an act of the will to make this firm resolution, even though
the intellect, from past experience, foresees the possibility of sinning
again. The knowledge that the same sin has been committed so often in the
past need not exclude from the act of repentance a firm purpose for the
future, especially when it is united to a strong trust in the mercy of
God, who will not suffer us to be tempted more than we are able (1 Cor. x
13). It must also be an efficacious resolution; that is to say, the will
must elect to adopt the necessary means for avoiding future sin,
especially by keeping away from the occasions which lead to it.
Hence the practical
value of a most careful consideration of all that is meant by the purpose
of amendment. Repeated falls even into the same sin do not necessarily
argue a defective purpose or a defective sorrow; it may have been a good
act of repentance at the time, though subsequent temptation, human
infirmity, and the force of habit have induced the will once more to
consent to sin. But, in a given instance, the lack of purpose in avoiding
an unnecessary occasion of sin, which could easily be put aside, must
sooner or later bring the repentant sinner to review his supposed sorrow,
and to ask himself whether his alleged detestation of sin is an illusion.
It is a momentous question to answer, for repentance, as we have described
it, is a condition which is absolutely necessary for salvation in an adult
who has committed mortal sin.
5. Necessity of repentance
Whether God, of his
absolute power, could forgive sin and infuse grace into the soul of a
person who has not repented, is extremely doubtful. But the question is
not what God could do, but what he actually does in the present order of
his providence, as revealed to us in Holy Scripture and defined by the
Church. For while, on the one hand, it is certain that man could not, of
his own power, attain to his supernatural end without the assistance of
God’s grace, it is equally certain that an adult who has come to the use
of reason must reach his last end in a manner which is in accordance with
his nature, by freely co-operating with divine grace. He must, that is to
say, dispose himself for justification by doing what is possible for a
human being to do. For a person who is in a state of mortal sin, the only
part of the process of justification that is possible is to detest the sin
he has committed. If he were relieved of the necessity of making at least
this act of repentance, and so disposing his soul for the reception of
grace, he would then perfect his being and realize the purpose of his
existence without contributing anything whatever to the process. This
would probably be intrinsically impossible, for it would not be in keeping
with the order of things, as we know them, in which everything attains the
purpose for which it was created by acting in accordance with its nature.
The movement of God, in the order of supernatural grace, anticipates every
human action: “No one can come to me except the Father, who hath sent me,
draw him” (John vi 44); but it is a movement perfecting, not destroying,
the free will of our nature, which must co-operate with divine grace.
The doctrine is evident
in the pages of Holy Scripture, and from the lives of the great
penitents. “You have said: The way of the Lord is not right. . . . Is it
my way that is not right, and are not rather your ways perverse? For when
the just turneth himself away from his justice, and committeth iniquity,
he shall die therein . . . and when the wicked turneth himself away from
his wickedness . . . he shall save his soul alive” (Ezech. xviii 25-27).
Therefore Christ warned all sinners that unless they repent they will all
perish (Luke xiii 3). The necessity of repentance as a condition for the
remission of sin is absolute: “Repentance was at all times necessary, in
order to obtain grace and justification, for all men who have defiled
themselves by mortal sin. . . . ” (Council of Trent, sess. xiv, chap. 4).
But if actual grace is
necessary for repentance, it is a grace which is never refused to one who
asks. “Converte nos, Deus,” is a prayer continually found throughout the
Divine Office, and there is a very striking prayer in the Missal which
asks God in his mercy to compel our stubborn wills to turn again to him
(Secret, Fourth Sunday after Pentecost).
Sin is disruptive of
divine charity. By repentance the sinner detests the cause of so great a
disaster. But of all the various motives which give rise to this
detestation there is one which is the highest and noblest that the human
mind can conceive. It is the love of God for his own sake.
V.
PERFECT CONTRITION
1. Connection with the Sacrament
of Penance
A person tied to a
post cannot reach another position until he is freed from his bonds. By
mortal sin we are abound in a state of slavery until we break those bonds
by repentance (Rom. vi), and are free to be united again in friendship
with God. There is no middle state in which we can rest, as it were, in a
condition of neutrality, neither in a state of grace nor in a state of
sin. A sinner who has detested his sin and promised amendment and
satisfaction has disposed his soul for justification, but he is not yet
restored to a state of grace. With the effects of sin still remaining in
his soul he still awaits the divine forgiveness which will effect complete
reconciliation by the infusion of sanctifying grace. This grace is given
solely through the merits of Jesus Christ our Lord, and the channel by
which it reaches us is the sacrament of Penance instituted by Christ for
the purpose. In this sacrament a priest, authorized by the Church, and
acting in the name and person of Christ absolves the sinner from his sins.
We need not be
concerned with discussing all the possible ways in which God could forgive
sin; we know from God’s revelation that the sins of the whole world, even
before Christ’s coming, are forgiven through Christ, “in whom we have
redemption through his blood, the remission of sins” (Col. i 14). Nor
need we try to imagine other ways in which the merits of Christ might have
been applied to those who have committed mortal sin after Baptism; we know
that Christ, “who did all things well” (Mark vii 37), has left with his
Church the power of loosing from sin (Cf. Essay xxvii). By mortal
sin grace, which unites us all as one body in Christ, is lost, and the
soul becomes a dead and useless member of that mystical body. It was
altogether fitting, if one may so speak of the actions of him “in whom are
hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge” (Col. ii 3), that a sinner
should be reunited to the body of Christ through the authority of that
body on earth, exercised by men who, in spite of their own sins and
unworthiness, are ambassadors of Christ (2 Cor. v 20) and dispensers of
the mysteries of God (1 Cor. iv 1). And if we reflect more deeply upon
all that it means to be a member of the body of Christ, we shall begin to
see why it is that our sins will not be forgiven unless we forgive others
their trespasses against us. Christ, therefore, has determined that the
repentant sinner will find forgiveness in the sacrament of Penance, and
unless sorrow for sin has some relation to the sacrament it will
not issue in the infusion of sanctifying grace. But what this connection
and relation is will differ according to a person’s knowledge and
opportunities.
Every Catholic is
aware that perfect contrition remits sin even before the sin has been
confessed. But this emphatically does not mean that it is forgiven apart
from all connection with the sacrament. A Catholic, who knows of his
obligation to submit all mortal sins to the power of the keys, does not
make an act of perfect contrition unless he intends to confess his sins at
a convenient opportunity. For since the sacrament of Penance is the
method instituted by Christ for the remission of sin, no sinner could be
called contrite who declined to do what God has laid down as the way to
forgiveness: such an attitude would at least argue a lack of the proper
undertaking to make satisfaction, which is a necessary condition of
repentance. A non-Catholic, whom we will assume to be in good faith and
inculpably ignorant of the obligation of confession, nevertheless
establishes some implicit connection between his repentance and the
sacrament of Penance. For in repenting of his sins, on a motive of
perfect contrition, he must necessarily undertake, as part of his
satisfaction, to do whatever Christ has determined to be necessary for
forgiveness. Implied in this purpose, did he but know it, is the
resolution to confess his sins as soon as his conscience appreciates the
obligation.
It would be quite
erroneous, therefore, to suppose that there are various ways open to
sinners in obtaining forgiveness, of which the sacrament of Penance is
one; for the Church teaches clearly and definitely that although perfect
contrition reconciles man to God before the sacrament has been received,
yet it does so only by virtue of the desire for the sacrament, which is
included, at least implicitly, in the act of contrition itself (Council of
Trent, sess. xiv, chap. 4).
2. Perfect love of God
Contrition is called
perfect when the motive which causes the will to detest sin is the love of
God for his own sake: it is called imperfect, or “attrition,” when the
motive is something quite distinct from this love of God; for example, the
deformity of sin or the fear of hell. Any attempt, therefore, to
understand more closely what is meant by perfect contrition, is equivalent
to enquiring what is meant by the love of God or charity.
Any love—for example,
the love of a son for his parents—can be of a twofold character. As a
small child he loves them solely because they are good to him, a comfort
in pain, a protection in the troubles of life, a never-failing source from
which he draws everything necessary for his life and happiness. But
gradually and imperceptibly this selfish kind of love should yield to a
love which is more generous and is concerned more with giving than
receiving, more with doing them some good than in self-seeking. The love
existing between two persons who discover that they are mutually an
advantage to each other is an excellent thing, but if the basis of mutual
love turns on each person desiring and trying to do the highest amount of
good to the other, generously, unselfishly, and constantly, there exists a
perfect friendship, than which there is nothing more beautiful in human
intercourse. Such love existing between the soul and God is so priceless
and dear that we give it the special name of “charity.”
Passing over, for the
moment, any discussions that might arise, and confining ourselves to what
is completely certain, we may say that contrition is perfect when its
motive is a love of God, not of the mercenary kind, based on the
consideration that he is good to us, but an unselfish love which we
conceive for him because he is good and lovable for his own sake, a love
whereby we rejoice in his infinite perfections, wishing him well, and
desiring him to be known and loved by all men. When we speak of perfect
contrition we mean repentance and sorrow for sin based on this motive: the
repentance, for example, of the woman to whom many sins were forgiven
because she loved much (Luke vii 47).
In a less strict
sense, although identical effects result in the soul, an act of perfect
love of God in which there is no explicit reference to past sin may
also be called an act of perfect contrition; for it is impossible for a
sinner to elicit this perfect love for God without also repenting of his
sins, did he but advert to them (It is doubtful, however, whether the
sorrow for past sin implicitly contained in an act of perfect love of God
suffices for the effect of the sacrament of Penance, since, as is
explained in Essay xxvii, the sorrow of the penitent is part of the
“matter” of this sacrament).
In both cases,
according to Catholic doctrine, the act of perfect contrition results in
immediate justification of the sinner, it being presumed that all the
requisite qualities of true repentance, as explained in the last section,
are at least implicitly present. By the infusion of grace and charity the
soul becomes once more a friend of God, a member of Christ’s mystical
body, and an heir with Christ to life eternal.
It must not be
supposed that an act of perfect contrition is in itself the cause of
effecting reconciliation with God, for this, since it entails the infusion
of grace, is in God’s free disposition and beyond the capabilities of any
creature. But since God never refuses grace to any man who does all that
he is able to do, it is altogether in accordance with his infinite mercy
and goodness that grace should not be withheld from one who has made the
highest possible endeavor to reach God that any creature can make.
Perfect contrition, therefore, though not the cause of justification, is
nevertheless so perfect a disposition in the sinner as to call infallibly
for the restoration of God’s friendship. God’s love, it is true, has
never faltered, for it is extended to all, even to sinner (Rom. v 8; 1
John iv 10); yet friendship does not exist until love is mutual, and
charity is nothing else than friendship between God and man. “If any man
love me, my Father will love him: and e will come to him and make our
abode with him” (John xiv 23).
The Council of Trent,
in expressing the constant teaching and tradition of the Church, takes it
for granted that contrition, which is perfect through charity, reconciles
man with God before the sacrament of Penance is actually is received (Sess.
xiv, chap. iv). The doctrine is certain if by charity is meant the love
of God because he is good in himself, not merely because he is good to
us. It is only contrition elicited on this motive which is properly
called “perfect,” and which, in the teaching of the Church, certainly
leads to justification (Some writers, wishing to render an act of perfect
contrition as easy as possible, allow the possibility of perfect
contrition in the love of God for selfish motives, i.e., because
union with him constitutes eternal happiness for us, or because our souls
are even now thirsting for the living God like the hart panting after the
fountains of water (Ps. xli 1). But this cannot be regarded with
certainty as sufficient for an act of perfect contrition, and in a matter
of such grave moment we cannot be satisfied with anything less than
certainty. Such lesser motives are excellent: they help the sinner to
detest sin above all things, and they lead to perfect contrition. But we
cannot help seeing on reflection that there is very little difference
between love of God, conceived for a selfish motive, and the fear of
hell. It is salutary sorrow for sin, but is imperfect, not perfect.)
3. Imperfect love of God
For the word “perfect”
implies that nothing is wanting in the action, and that its fullness is
complete and entire. But if the motive of contrition is anything short of
God’s own self, it is evidently not as perfect as it might be (It is, of
course, possible to elicit perfect contrition by a consideration of any
one attribute of God—his benignity or his mercy, for example—provided it
is considered as a divine perfection, and not merely as something very
advantageous to ourselves. The reason for this is that the attributes of
God, which the human mind regards separately, are not really distinct in
God. Cf. Essay iii, The One God, p. 92). Thus an imperfect
motive of contrition might easily be the desire to render to God something
due to him, on a title of justice, obedience, or gratitude. It can be
understood, from an analogy with purely human relations, that a man might
be ready to make reparation to another because he is in his debt or
subject to his authority, or because he has received favors from his
hands. Yet, while doing this, he might feel wholly unable to regret his
offense out of regard for the persona qualities and excellence of the
other person.
Still more easily can
it be seen that to seek reconciliation with an injured friend, because the
loss of his friendship is a grave inconvenience, is a motive which leaves
an enormous amount to be desired. Nevertheless, as will be shown more
fully in the essay on The Sacrament of Penance, the fear of hell,
or any other less noble motive leading us to detest sin, suffices,
provided the sacrament is not merely desired but actually received. The
only point necessary to notice here is that the justification of the
sinner, whether in the case of perfect contrition or in the reception of
the sacrament of Penance, is brought about in both cases by the infusion
of sanctifying grace. But the means by which that grace is given is in
one case the reception of a sacrament of the New Law, one of the seven
signs instituted by Christ as channels of divine grace, external signs
which by virtue of their own action as instruments in the hands of Christ
convey grace from the head to the members of his body. In the other case
the grace of justification is given to a man who by his own activity,
under the divine inspiration, has so disposed his soul by doing all that
it is possible for him to do, that God immediately gives the grace of his
friendship.
The more perfect our
contrition is, in receiving the sacrament, the more pleasing it is to God
and the more grace is received. For a soul already justified by perfect
contrition, in receiving the sacrament receives still more grace, and
becomes more deeply rooted and grounded in charity.
4. How to make an act of perfect
contrition
It should therefore be
our constant care to make more and more perfect the motive of our sorrow
for sin. It is difficult in the sense that perfect contrition requires
complete detachment from our sins, and careful reflection on divine
things, which in the modern rush of life is not always easy to secure; it
is difficult, too, because it is not easy to break away from selfish and
excessive preoccupation with our own advantage and happiness, even in
matters religious. But, granted a certain degree of generosity towards
God, it should be comparatively easy gradually to purify our motives and
arrive almost imperceptibly at perfect contrition.
In a matter that
concerns so intimately the internal dispositions of each soul it is not
possible to suggest any definite rule: each person must follow the line of
thought which is most suitable in leading him to perfect contrition. The
fear of God is the beginning of all wisdom, and the thought of eternal
separation from God would usually be the starting-point. A further step
would be to think of the pain of loss as being inflicted by one who loves
us with infinite love. Sin is an offense and an insult against God, for
whom we should have nothing but gratitude in return for all his favors,
both spiritual and temporal, and above all for his unspeakable gift of
grace by which we are made his adopted sons in Christ (2 Cor. ix 15).
“How hath he not also with him given us all things?” (Rom. viii 32) Have
we made any return for these gifts, or are all our prayers invariably
petitions for further favors? God has been good to us, but why? Not
because there is anything beautiful or lovable about us apart from our
union with Christ, for whose sake God loves us (John xvi 27). No matter
how we look at it, there is nothing in us that we have not received from
God (1 Cor. iv 7), nothing intrinsic to our own deeds to cause God to
treat us with such benignity. Why, then, is God good to us? For no other
reason than because he is good in himself.
Nor is this divine
goodness something abstract which we can get to know and understand only
by a process of philosophic thought. He was made flesh and dwelt amongst
us, grew weary in seeking us, shed tears for us, suffered and died for
us. Yet this infinite goodness we have insulted and offended by mortal
sin. . . . By such gradual and easy steps as these it is possible to
develop the motive of contrition from the notion of fear to that of love
of God for his own sake. It is only on elevated motives of this kind that
we can gradually perfect our lives, not only by avoiding mortal sin, but
by gradually eliminating all trace even of deliberate venial sin. Most of
all, it is on this motive alone that we shall begin to understand the
infinite mercy of God in granting the gift of repentance, from its first
stirring in our souls to its completion in the infusion of divine grace.
For it is chiefly by sparing and having mercy upon us that God manifests
his almighty power (Collect, Eleventh Sunday after Pentecost).
VI.
VENIAL SIN
1. A sin consistent with grace
and charity
We have already
recalled the fact that the word “sin” is used only analogously of venial
offenses. That is to say, there is a certain resemblance between mortal
sin and venial sin, inasmuch as each is an offense against the law of
God. There is, however, a vital difference between them, and that
difference it is our object here to explain.
Christ our Lord in his
parables often likened the life of our souls to the growth of plants or
trees. In the case of these it is often possible to detect some radical
defect or disease which will prevent them from ever reaching maturity.
Sometimes, on the other hand, one may find minor blemishes—say in a
rose-tree, which will not hinder its ultimate blossoming, but which make
it less lovely and beautiful in the eyes of an expert. It would be true
to say that the law of the plant’s growth requires the absence not only of
radical disease, but of minor defects also. But it would be much more
accurate to regard as, strictly speaking, against the law of its
nature only those defects which prevents its growth to maturity. No one
could refuse to call it a rote-tree simply because the scent and color of
its blossoms were not up to the desired standard.
It is rather similar
with the individual soul. It would be true to say that the slightest
transgression is against the law of God, but it would be much more
accurate to say that only those breaches of the law are to be regarded, in
the strict sense of the word, as against the law of God which
prevent a man from attaining his last end; that is to say, only those sins
which are disruptive of divine charity, and which entail the loss of grace
and liability to eternal separation from God.
Like all examples taken
to illustrate doctrines, the example of a plant’s growth is necessarily
imperfect, but it serves to explain the difference between mortal and
venial sin. There are many minor offenses, forbidden indeed by the law of
God, but which do not so radically upset the established moral order as to
make the attainment of man’s last end impossible. They offend God, but do
not offend him to the extent of breaking off the union of charity existing
between our souls and him; and since union with God is the end of our
existence, they are not strictly against the law of God.
If it is asked why
this is so, one can only answer by asking why it is that the germs of
certain diseases will utterly prevent a plant from growing to maturity,
while other noxious germs are not so destructive. God has so fashioned
human nature, and so raised it to a supernatural state, that certain
culpable departures from the law which governs man’s being have the effect
of preventing his end and purpose in life from being realized. “Thy hands
have made me and formed me: give me understanding, and I will learn thy
commandments” (Ps. cxviii 73).
Man may willfully
transgress the divine law in various ways, but, provided the principle of
his supernatural life is not destroyed, he still remains properly disposed
towards God, his last end and happiness, and the effects of such actions
are not of their nature irreparable, precisely because the principle of
divine grace and charity is not lost. Thus a mathematician engaged in the
solution of a difficult problem may make small errors, but, if the
principles on which his calculations rest are sound, he can easily retrace
his steps and correct the mistakes he has made. Even the healthiest
persons suffer some disease or illness at some time or other, but their
own strength and vitality suffice to enable them to recover from the ill
effects; if, however, the disease is one which has destroyed the life of
some vital organ, then nothing short of a miracle will restore them to
health.
Those sins, therefore,
which do not involve the loss of grace, and whose effects can be repaired
by the supernatural principle of grace and charity, which still remain in
the soul, are called “venial.” The word itself, which is derived from
venia, “pardon,” could equally be used, and was so used by early
writers, with reference to repented mortal sin, for there is no sin which
God will not forgive. But, inasmuch as the liability to eternal
punishment, the necessary effect of mortal sin, is not incurred except by
the loss of grace, any sin which does not merit eternal punishment is of
its nature worthy of pardon, and the term “venial” is properly applied to
it. For no matter how long or how grievous the temporal punishment due to
such sins may be, the soul must inevitably reach its last end, as long as
it does not suffer the loss of sanctifying grace. He who sins venially is
retarded on his journey towards God, but, unlike a person in mortal sin
who is averted from his last end, he remains on the way which leads to God
and will eventually possess him. “For although, during this mortal life,
men, no matter how holy and just they may be, fall daily into small sins,
which are called venial, they do not thereby, cease to be just” (Council
of Trent, sess. vi, chap. 9).
If, therefore, we
compare venial and mortal sin from the point of view of their effects on
the soul, the complete difference between the two is apparent. But when
we examine venial sin from the angle of the person sinning, it appears, at
first sight, that in electing to turn inordinately to creatures in a
manner forbidden by the divine law, the sinner shows that, in putting his
own will above the will of God, he is choosing some creature instead of
God.
If this conclusion were
true and necessary it would be difficult to see how venial sin differs
from mortal sin. The phrase “the will of God” means, however, in this
connection, something which God has forbidden, and we cannot draw any
conclusions at all until we have determined whether a thing is forbidden
by God under the pain of forfeiting the divine friendship or not. Acts
forbidden as venial sins are of such character that they do not forfeit
the divine friendship, and it is because the sinner is aware of this that
it is possible for him to offend God and at the same time remain united to
him.
The same is true of
human friendships. A person might easily displease his friend in many
minor matters, but would never run the risk of destroying the friendship
altogether by doing things which he foresaw would have this result. So
also in the case of a person committing venial sin. He is so disposed
towards God that if he thought that a breach of the divine law would
result in the loss of divine grace and charity, he would not commit it for
any reason whatever.
From such considerations
as these it will be evident that an erroneous conscience has a most
important influence in determining the existence of mortal sin. If a
person is an invincibly ignorant that he is in good faith in thinking that
an action which is objectively grave is no more than venial sin, then
venial sin is actually committed owing to the error. Similarly the
persuasion that an action is mortally sinful constitutes mortal sin in the
person who commits it, even though his mind was in error in making the
judgment.
Also it is most
important to recall the necessity of advertence and consent for mortal sin
even when there is no sort of error concerning the objective malice of the
offense. It can be said with certainty that many offenses fall short of
the complete malice of mortal sin owing to the consent being, on various
counts, defective. We talk of “falling into” mortal sin, but no one can
fall into it in the sense of doing it accidentally and unawares. It can
be said with equal certainty that the real issue is known to God alone,
the searcher of hearts. Unless the venial or mortal nature of a sin is
abundantly evident, it is a dangerous procedure for the human mind to
attempt to diagnose the guilt, even in one’s own sins; and still more
dangerous regarding the sins of other people. There are numerous cases in
which the border-line cannot be accurately determined; for example, in
deciding on the consent given to evil thoughts, or in determining the
gravity of theft. The only safe rule is expressly to repent of any sin
which might conceivably be grave, and to confess it as such.
2. Effects
Let us now examine more
closely the effects of venial sin upon the soul. In the first place,
sanctifying grace is not lost by any offense short of mortal sin, and,
inasmuch as the “stain” of sin is nothing else than the privation of
grace, it follows that venial sin does not, strictly speaking, cause a
stain, which we have already seen to be the consequence of mortal sin.
Venial sin is opposed to
the charity which should exist between the soul and God, not in the sense
that it is inconsistent with the habitual state of grace by which we are
united to God’s love through a vivifying union with Christ, but in the
sense that the acts prompted by the virtue of charity are rendered by
venial sin less fervent in their expression.
The distinction turns on
the difference between habitual grace with the attendant virtue of
charity, which every soul well ordered towards its last end possesses, and
the fervor of the acts elicited by the soul in that state. The effect of
mortal sin is to destroy habitual grace and charity, a privation which is
called in the Scriptures the stain of sin; the effect of venial sin is to
impede the fervor of the acts of a person, who, while possessing the
intrinsic state of friendship with God, nevertheless directs his actions
to the attainment of his last end only remissly and tardily.
Just as the word “sin”
applies strictly to mortal sin and only analogously to venial sin, so
also, if we prefer to use the word “stain” in order to express the effect
of venial sin on the soul, it can be used only analogously and
imperfectly. There is all the difference in the world between a child who
cannot leap and jump owing to a crippled state of limb, and one who is
merely suffering from languor and disinclination. IN the one case it is
due to a permanent and habitual disorder, in the other case the lassitude
can be overcome with a little effort. We must therefore remove altogether
from our consideration of venial sin and its effects the notion of stain
resulting from the privation of grace, and, as a consequence, the
liability to eternal punishment incurred by a soul in that state. We can
see that from venial sin there results in the sinner the obligation of
acknowledging his guilt and the debt of punishment. There is guilt
because venial sin is a breach of the divine law and displeases God,
though not to the extent of destroying his friendship. There is also the
debt of punishment, for the divine order has been disturbed and the sinner
must restore that order by undergoing a penalty proportionate to the
offense, even though the punishment is of a temporal nature.
These two things, guilt
and punishment, are the two immediate effects of venial sin. But before
we discuss repentance as applied to these offenses we must be aware of
certain possibilities arising from deliberate venial sin. It is very
necessary to establish a clear and definite division between mortal and
venial sin, but in doing so we must beware lest the mind imperceptibly and
almost unconsciously should form a judgment that venial sin is a trifling
matter of no consequence whatever.
The remarks we have to
make apply only to deliberate offenses. We have already seen that venial
sin may arise from insufficient advertence and consent, fleeting thoughts,
sudden access of passion, unthinking and indeliberate movements which are
rejected almost as soon as they are experienced. With regard to venial
sins of this kind it is the accepted teaching of the Church that not even
the holiest person can altogether avoid them. But with deliberate venial
sin—a small theft, for example—our judgment must be altogether different.
It follows from the
nature of venial sin that no number of such offenses will ever be
equivalent to one mortal sin. But indirectly, and as a consequence,
deliberate venial sin will lead to mortal sin. Nemo fit repente
pessimus—nobody becomes evil all at once. It is a slow and gradual
process which leads the will eventually to commit mortal sin. Deliberate
transgression of the law of God in small matters causes a habit of mind
which grows accustomed to deflections from the moral order, and gradually
disposes the sinner to depart from it in a serious matter. Imperceptibly
a state of mind is generated which is set on discovering to what extent
the law of God can be broken without committing grave sin. It is betrayed
by a certain theological dexterity in trying to discover the least
obligation consistent with remaining in a state of grace. Is it necessary
to point out that a person walking on the edge of a precipice is in danger
of falling over? “He that is faithful in that which is least is faithful
also in that which is greater: and he that is unjust in that which is
little is unjust also in that which is greater” (Luke xvi 10). It is
because we are creatures of habit, and because each deliberate sin paves
the way to one slightly graver, that spiritual writers often refer to
venial sin in terms which to the unthinking appear exaggerated. There is
no need of warning from spiritual writers. Everyone knows from his own
experience, and from the experience of others, that the commission of
mortal sin is the result of a series of deliberate transgressions in
smaller matters.
The important thing is
to purge the soul from what St. Francis de Sales calls the “affection” for
venial sin, which he describes as the chief obstacle to that devotion
which consists in a ready and willing service of God. “They weaken the
strength of the spirit, hinder the divine consolations, open the door to
temptations, and, although they do not kill the soul, make it excessively
ill” (Devout Life, Bk. I, chap. xxii).
3. Remission
Perhaps there is nothing
which so completely illustrates the essential difference between mortal
and venial sin as an enquiry into the various ways by which venial sin can
be remitted. The Catholic doctrine regarding the remission of mortal sin
turns, as we have seen, on the sacrament of Penance, which in the present
order is the way determined by God for reconciliation with him. If the
sinner repents of mortal sin, in the sense explained above, even though it
be only through fear of God’s punishment, he is in the salutary
disposition for justification. By the divine mercy the absolution of a
priest authorized by the Church restores the repentant sinner to a state
of grace and friendship with God, and if the motive of contrition is the
love of God above all things, the soul is immediately justified, even
before the sacrament is received, provided it is at least implicitly
desired.
In as much as the state
of mortal sin is equivalent to the loss of sanctifying grace, and the
infusion of grace is identical with the remission of mortal sin, the
doctrine concerning the remission of mortal sin can be easily understood
and clearly formulated. But it is not possible to state with quite the
same directness the method by which the guilt of venial sin is remitted,
for venial sin is not accompanied by the loss or diminution of habitual
grace and charity; it causes the acts elicited by a person in the state of
grace to be lessened in fervor; it does not destroy charity, but merely
impedes its exercise. It is because the effects of venial sin are of this
character that it is difficult to state the doctrine concerning their
remission, for the effects must necessarily differ with the individual,
and will depend very largely on the degree of virtue and sanctity which
has been attained; whereas the effects of mortal sin, as far as the loss
of grace is concerned, are identical in all sinners. Nevertheless, on the
data already examined, it is possible to outline the ordinary theological
teaching.
It is needless to say
that venial sin is adequate and sufficient matter for sacramental
absolution. This is the simplest and most obvious way of securing
forgiveness from God, and is universally practiced by the faithful
throughout the whole Church. But, inasmuch as venial sins can be remitted
in other ways, there exists no obligation to confess them in the tribunal
of penance. Furthermore, and as a consequence of this certain doctrine,
an act of perfect contrition remits venial sin without any sort of clause
or condition referring to the future reception of the sacrament penance.
We have seen that the
sinner, in repenting of mortal sin, is about to use sufficient diligence
to recall the mortal sins that he has committed, in order to repent of
each one that he remembers. But, since venial sins need not necessarily
be confessed—there being various other ways in which they may be
remitted—they need not each be recalled to mind. This does not mean that
repentance is unnecessary for venial sin. It means only that the
repentance need not be explicit in respect of each venial sin that we have
committed. Such explicit repentance is indeed desirable; but it is
sufficient that we be prepared explicitly to repent should such venial
sins be recalled to mind. A further difference between repentance for
mortal sin and repentance for venial sin should be noted: it is possible
to repent of one venial sin without repenting of the others, whereas in
the case of mortal sin this is not possible. Apart from these
differences, repentance for venial sin should include all the essentials
of repentance already explained.
It follows, therefore,
that various movements of the soul towards God, especially when they are
accompanied by the reception of a sacrament or by some public rite of the
Church, will have the effect of remitting venial sin, even though there is
no formal and explicit repentance. For since we have seen the effect of
venial sin to consist in a diminution of the fervor of our actions, it
follows that some act of devotion or piety deliberately performed will
have the effect of restoring the balance, always provided that an explicit
act of repentance would be made did we but advert to the sin. This is
especially the case when the act is not merely a private one, such as
almsgiving or other works of charity, but is accompanied by some special
intervention of the Church, as in the use of various sacramentals,
blessings, or other sacred rites with which Catholics are familiar.
Most of all is the
remission of venial sin obtained by the reception of the sacraments,
especially of the Holy Eucharist. It is not only the antidote which
preserves us from mortal sin, as the Council of Trent teaches (Sess. xiii,
chap. 2), but it frees us from daily faults. “Just as by bodily food the
daily waste and loss is repaired, so also the Holy Eucharist repairs what
has been lost through our falls into lesser sins, by remitting them”
(Catechism of the Council of Trent, Part II, chap. iv, q. 50).
In all these ways of
securing the remission of venial sin, it must be clearly understood that
repentance is necessary, either actually and explicitly, as when venial
sins are confessed, or at least implicitly to the extent that the
recollection of such sins would be attended by repentance did we but
advert to them or recall them to our minds. In this sense all the
qualities of true repentance must be present, and in particular the
purpose of amendment, if we are to obtain remission of venial sin.
It will be perceived,
therefore, that in some ways it is difficult to repent of lesser sins, for
it requires very considerable reflection and determination in order to
detest a venial sin above all evils. Accordingly, since remission of
punishment only follows remission of guilt, we cannot form an exact
estimate concerning the extent of our debt of punishment. That debt may
be exacted to the last farthing. We may gain plenary indulgences, but the
penalty of unrepented venial sin is not included in the remission. A
proper appreciation of the nature of venial sin helps us not only to
perceive how utterly different it is from mortal sin, but to understand
more perfectly the necessity of a cleansing purgation after death, since
nothing defiled can enter heaven (Apoc. xxi 27). Above all, it brings
home to our minds something of the meaning of holiness, without which no
man can see God (Heb. xii 14).
VII.
REPARATION
God incarnate suffered
and died in order to repair the ruin caused by sin, by offering to his
eternal Father adequate satisfaction for the affront to God’s majesty.
The Redeemer of mankind is spoken of in the Holy Scripture as “bearing our
infirmities, bruised for our sins” (Isa. liii 4) “made sin for us” (2 Cor.
v 21). But, inasmuch as Christ himself was sinless, he could not make an
act of repentance in the sense explained above; hence the Church has
strictly forbidden such phrases as “Christ the Penitent” even in a
devotional use. He did not repent for the sinners of the world: he
offered satisfaction for their sins. The same is true, proportionately,
of the many instances in the lives of the saints, in which we are told
that they undertook penance for the sins of others. Only the sinner can
repent in the strict sense of the word; but that part of repentance which
is concerned with offering satisfaction to God can be undertaken
vicariously by others.
For it has pleased God
to redeem all men, who fell corporately in Adam, by incorporating them in
Christ the second Adam. From the doctrine of the Mystical Body of Christ
(Cf. Essay xix) many profound truths of deep significance are
drawn. In particular the familiar idea of Reparation, included in
Catholic devotion towards the Sacred Heart of Jesus, has its doctrinal
basis in the fact that all Christians are members of one body whose head
is Christ. On this solidarity of the whole human race in Christ rests,
not only the justification but the necessity of the Christian practice of
offering reparation to God, in various ways, for the sins of the world.
For the notion of reparation, while including our own personal offenses,
is chiefly concerned with satisfaction for the sins of others.
In the plenitude of his
desire to expiate for the sins of the world, Christ chose the way of
suffering. It is chiefly by suffering, therefore, that the members of his
mystical body share in Christ’s expiatory sacrifice. Not only do they
share in it, but it is the will of Christ that their sufferings should be
necessary for the completion of his own. In “filling up those things that
are wanting of the sufferings of Christ” (Col. i 24), St. Paul rejoiced in
his own sufferings and besought his brethren “to present their bodies a
living sacrifice, holy, pleasing unto God” (Rom. xii 1).
Deliberately to choose
suffering requires an unusual degree of sanctity, as well as a finer
appreciation of all that it means to be a follower of Christ. The
illustrious examples drawn from the lives of saints, whether in the ranks
of the priesthood, or of religious Orders, or of the laity, are imitated
in our own times also. But every Christian is expected to suffer with
Christ by patience and resignation in adversity, in the pains of illness,
in poverty, in subjection to authority, and in performing the duties of
his state of life.
The value of our
reparation consists, of course, not in suffering as such, but in freely
and deliberately offering it to God in union with the passion of Christ.
This may be done during times of prayer, but the moment above all others
when such reparation should be offered to God is while assisting at the
sacrifice of the Mass, which is one with that of Calvary. The priest
offers that sacrifice in the name of the whole Church and “of all here
present, whose faith and devotion are known unto thee; for whom we offer,
or who offer up to thee, this sacrifice . . . this oblation of our service
as also of thy whole family” (Canon of the Mass). “Even as I willingly
offered myself to God for thy sins upon the Cross . . . even so must thou
willingly offer thyself daily to me in the Mass” (Imitation, Bk.
IV, chap. 8). Per ipsum et cum ipso et in ipso.
Thus in commending to
the faithful the necessity of making reparation to the Sacred Heart of
Jesus, Pius XI speaks as follows in the Encyclical Miserentissimus
Redemptor: “Although the plentiful redemption of Christ abundantly
forgives all our offenses, yet by that wonderful disposition of the divine
Wisdom whereby we have to fill up in our own flesh those things that are
wanting of the sufferings of Christ, for his body which is the Church
(Col. i 24), we can, nay, we must, add our own praise and satisfaction to
the praise and satisfaction which Christ gave to God in the name of
sinners. It should be remembered, however, that the expiatory value of
our acts depends solely upon the bloody sacrifice of Christ, a sacrifice
which is renewed unceasingly, in an unbloody manner, on our altars. . . .
For this reason, with the august sacrifice of the Eucharist must be united
the immolation of the ministers and also of the rest of the faithful, so
that they too may offer themselves ‘a living sacrifice, holy, pleasing
unto God’ ((Rom. xii 1). Christ, then, as he still suffers in his
mystical body, rightly desires us to be united with him because, since we
are ‘the body of Christ and members of member’ (1 Cor. xii 27), what the
head suffers the members should suffer with it” (Ibid. 26. Pius
XI, Miserentissimus Redemptor, May 8, 1928, Eng. Trans., Burns
Oates and Washbourne).
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